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Abstract
We show that binomial economies with financial assets are an informative
and tractable model to study endogenous leverage and collateral equilibrium:
endogenous leverage can be highly volatile, but it is always easy to compute.
The possibility of default can have a dramatic effect on equilibrium, if collateral
is scarce, yet we prove the No-Default Theorem asserting that, without loss
of generality, there is no default in equilibrium. Thus potential default has a
dramatic effect on equilibrium, but actual default does not. This result is valid
with arbitrary preferences, contingent promises, many assets and consumption
goods, production, and multiple periods. On the other hand, we show that
the theorem fails in trinomial models. For example, in a CAPM model, we
find that default is robust. In a model with heterogeneous beliefs, we find that
different agents might borrow on the same asset with different LT V s.
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Introduction

The recent financial crises has brought the impact of leverage on financial system
stability to the forefront. The crisis might well be understood as the bottom of a
leverage cycle in which leverage and asset prices crashed together. It was preceded
by years in which asset prices and the amount of leverage in the financial system
increased dramatically. What determines leverage or margin levels in equilibrium?
Do these levels involve default? What is the effect of leverage and default on asset
prices and the real side of the economy? Needless to say, providing answers to these
questions is of key importance.
In this paper we prove a No-Default Theorem for any binomial economy with
financial assets (i.e., assets which give no direct utility to investors and pay the
same dividends no matter who owns them). We show that every equilibrium with
endogenous leverage can be replaced by another equilibrium with the same asset
prices and the same consumption by each agent, in which there is no default.1 Thus
potential default has a dramatic effect on equilibrium, but actual default does not.
The No-Default Theorem is valid in a very general context with arbitrary preferences,
contingent promises, many assets, many consumption goods, multiple periods, and
production.
The No-Default Theorem shows that for every homogeneous family of promises
that (i) use the same asset as collateral, (ii) differ only by a scalar multiplicative factor
and (iii) includes the max min promise, we can assume only the max min promise
is actively traded in equilibrium.2 The max min representative for the family is the
largest promise in the family which is sure to pay off in full, and is equal to the asset
value in at least one state. Thus even with many assets, and many homogeneous
families of contracts, there will be no default.
The No-Default Theorem not only shows that actual default is irrelevant, but also
provides very simple predictions about how leverage is determined. For example, for
the homogenous family of simple (non-contingent) debt contracts, the equilibrium
LT V of any actively traded contract can be taken to be the ratio of the worst case
return of the collateral divided by the riskless rate of interest. The upshot is that
1
The choice of leverage might thus be described by a rule which sets the value at risk (VAR)
equal to zero.
2
Though the promises in a homogeneous family are scalar multiples of each other, the deliveries,
which are the minimum of the collateral value and the promise, can be highly nonlinearly related.
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equilibrium leverage in binomial economies with financial assets is extremely easy to
compute.
There are two key assumptions in the theorem. First, we only consider financial
assets, that is, assets that do not give direct utility to their holders, and which
yield dividends that are independent of who holds them. Second, we assume that
the economy is binomial, and that all loans are for one period.3 A date-event tree
in which every state is succeeded by exactly two nodes suggests a world with very
short maturity loans and no big jumps in asset values, since Brownian motion can
be approximated by binary trees with short intervals. Binomial models might thus
be taken as good models of Repo markets, in which the assets do seem to be purely
financial, and the loans are extremely short term, usually one day. Repo market
loans almost never default, including during the leverage crisis of 2007-9.4
The No-Default Theorem implies that if we want to study consumption or production or asset price effects of actual default, we must do so in models that either
include non-financial assets (like houses or asymmetrically productive land) or that
depart from the standard binomial models used in finance. This shows that there is
a tremendous difference between physical collateral that generates contemporaneous
utility and backs long term promises, and financial collateral that gives utility only
through dividends or other cash flows, and backs very short term promises. The
No-Default Theorem might explain why there are some markets (like mortgages) in
which defaults are to be expected while in others (like Repos) margins are set so
strictly that default is almost ruled out.
The No-Default Theorem has a sort of Modigliani-Miller feel to it. But the
theorem does not assert that the debt-equity ratio is irrelevant. It shows that if
we start from any equilibrium, we can move to an equivalent equilibrium, typically
with less leverage, in which only no-default contracts are traded. The theorem does
not say that starting from an equilibrium with no default, one can construct another
equivalent equilibrium with even less leverage. Typically one cannot. In the paper we
give an example with a unique equilibrium in which every borrower leverages to the
maximum amount without default, but no agent would be indifferent to leveraging
any less. In that example, Modigliani-Miller completely fails. Modigliani-Miller does
3

We could also allow for a long term loan with one payment date, provided that all the states
at that date could be partitioned into two events, on each of which the loan promise and the asset
value is constant.
4
Repo defaults, including of the Bear Stearns hedge funds, seem to have totaled a few billion
dollars out of the trillions of dollars of repo loans during the period 2007-2009.
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not hold in our model because issuers of debt must hold collateral, and because we
do not allow short selling of the assets. As we will explain in detail in the paper, the
proof of the No-Default Theorem relies on positive spanning, not spanning.
We begin by proving the No-Default Theorem in a very simple static model, with
two periods, one asset, and a homogeneous family of simple debt (non-contingent)
contracts. The intuition of the proof is based on two ideas. We first show that any
two portfolios that give the same payoffs in the two states must cost the same. We
then show that in equilibrium each agent is indifferent to replacing his portfolio with
another such that on each unit of collateral that he holds, he either leverages to the
maximum amount without risk of default, or does not leverage at all. It is important
to realize that the new portfolio may involve each agent holding a different amount
of the collateral asset than he did in the original equilibrium. Agents are indifferent
to switching to the new portfolio because its payoffs are the same and because of the
assumption that the asset is a financial asset. The assumption of two states implies
that the payoffs are positively spanned by the Arrow security that pays in the good
state (which can be obtained by holding the asset and shorting the max min debt
using the asset as collateral) and the max min debt contract. If there were three
states, it might be impossible for the seller to reproduce his original portfolio payoffs
from a portfolio in which he can only hold the asset and issue the max min debt.
One interesting feature of the proof is that it demonstrates the existence of state
prices that price the asset and the entire homogeneous family of contracts that use
the asset as collateral, even though short-selling is not allowed. The proof therefore
shows that even a hypothetical trader who could sell the asset short and did not
need to put up collateral could not find an arbitrage opportunity using the asset and
all the contracts in the same family. Moreover, we show that those state prices are
unique. In short, in a binomial economy with one kind of collateral and one family
of debt promises, we always get unique state (Arrow) prices but not necessarily
an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. In binomial economies with many assets, or many
different families of loans on the same asset, the No Default Theorem still holds, but
state pricing of all contracts is typically impossible.
Another feature of the proof is that it shows that every asset has a maximum
debt capacity for each homogeneous family of contracts, given by the value of the
max min contract. This debt capacity might be far below the value of the asset. The
great advantage of a binomial model with uncertainty is that the debt capacity can
fall sharply due to an increase in volatility (that lowers the worst case and increases
4

the best case scenario in the future), even if the asset value does not fall. The
loan to value ratio (of loan amount to asset value) or LT V depends not only on
first moments, but also on second moments, becoming genuinely endogenous. By
contrast, in models of collateral without uncertainty, the debt capacity of a financial
asset is always equal to the value of the asset.5
The No-Default Theorem shows that the equilibrium LT V for each family of
contracts depends on current and future asset prices, but is otherwise independent
of the utilities or the endowments of the agents. If nobody wants to borrow beyond
the debt capacity of the asset, then the collateral requirements are irrelevant, and
debt is determined by the preferences of the agents in the economy, just as in models
without collateral. In this case, we might say debt is determined by demand. On
the other hand, if collateral is scarce, and agents are borrowing against all of it, then
total borrowing is determined by the debt capacities of the assets, independently
from agent preferences for borrowing. In this case, we might say debt is determined
by the supply of debt capacity. Nonetheless, as the No-Default Theorem states, the
equilibrium LT V in each homogeneous family can be taken to be the same in both
cases.
Many papers in the literature assume the Value at Risk equals Zero rule (which
precludes default), often in contexts where the No-Default Theorem does not apply.
In the last section, we study two examples of economies extensively used in the financial literature: i) heterogeneous beliefs and ii) CAPM investors with differences in
risk aversion and endowments. First, in order to illustrate the No-Default Theorem,
we study both cases in a binomial economy, showing that in the simplest context
the No-Default Theorem and the State Pricing Theorem apply, but that in more
general binomial models, the No-Default Theorem still applies while state pricing
fails. Second, we extend the examples to three states of nature and show that the
No-Default Theorem also fails. There is still a debt capacity for each family of contracts, but now the maximum possible loan almost always involves default. Agents
who choose to borrow less will use different leverage. In other words, we find two
main departures from the the No-Default Theorem. First, both examples show that
with enough heterogeneity among investors, equilibrium default is robust. Second,
we find that more than one contract can be actively traded in equilibrium on the
same collateral, that is, the asset might be bought at different LTVs by different
5

In the case of financial assets, the value of the asset is the present value of future payments.
When there is only one future state, and the entire asset can be costlesly seized upon default, the
debt capacity is 100% of the value of the financial asset.
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agents. During the period 1997-2007, prime borrowers typically bought houses with
high down-payments and low interest rates while subprime borrowers were putting
almost no money down but paying a high interest rate on the same kinds of houses.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review. Section
3 presents a static model of endogenous leverage and debt with one asset and proves
the Simple No-Default and State Pricing Theorems. Section 4 presents the general
model of endogenous leverage and proves the general No-Default Theorem. Section
5 presents examples.

2

Literature

To attack the leverage endogeneity problem we follow the techniques developed by
Geanakoplos (1997). Agents have access to a menu of contracts, each of them characterized by a promise in future states and one unit of asset as collateral to back the
promise. When an investor sells a contract she is borrowing money and putting up
collateral; when she is buying a contract, she is lending money. In equilibrium every
contract, as well as the asset used as collateral, will have a price. Each collateralpromise pair defines a contract, and every contract has a leverage or loan to value
(the ratio of the price of the promise to the price of the collateral). The key is that
even if all contracts are priced in equilibrium, because collateral is scarce, only a few
will be actively traded. In this sense, leverage becomes endogenous.
Geanakoplos (2003, 2010), Fostel-Geanakoplos (2008, 2012a and 2012b), and Cao
(2010), all work with binomial models of collateral equilibrium with financial assets,
showing in their various special cases that, as the Binomial No-Default Theorem
implies, only the VaR= 0 contract is traded in equilibrium. These papers generally
show that higher leverage leads to higher asset prices.
Geanakoplos (2003) stated a slightly stronger Binomial No-Default theorem (that
equilibrium is also unique) in the special case of a continuum of agents with different
priors, in which every agent was risk neutral and did not discount the future, and
in which the agents’ subjective probability of the up state increased monotonically
and continuously in the index of the agent. Fostel-Geanakoplos (2012a) formally
proved that theorem. The Binomial No-Default Theorem proved in this paper is
more general in that it does not depend on the number of agents, or on continuity
of preferences across agents, or on identical discount rates, or on risk neutrality, or
6

on any assumption about endowments (for example it does not assume that each
agent’s endowments in terminal periods is spanned by the asset). It includes the
case where there is a finite number of agent types, as well as the case where there is
a continuum of heterogeneous agents.
Other papers have already given examples in which the No-Default Theorem
does not hold. Geanakoplos (1997) gave a binomial example with a non-financial
asset (a house, from which agents derived utility), in which equilibrium leverage was
high enough that there was default. Geanakoplos (2003) gave an example with a
continuum of risk neutral investors with different priors and three states of nature
in which the only contract traded in equilibrium involved default. Simsek (2010)
gave an example with two types of investors and a continuum of states of nature
with equilibrium default. Araujo, Kubler, and Schommer (2012) provided a two
period example of an asset which is used as collateral in two different actively traded
contracts when agents have utility over the asset. Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012a)
provide an example with three states and multiple contracts traded in equilibrium.
This paper is related to a large and growing literature on collateral equilibrium
and leverage. Some of these papers focus on investor-based leverage (the ratio of an
agent’s total asset value to his total wealth) as in Acharya and Viswanathan (2011),
Adrian and Shin (2010), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011) and Gromb and Vayanos
(2002). Other papers, such as Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Cao (2010), Fostel
and Geanakoplos (2008, 2012a and 2012b), Geanakoplos (1997, 2003 and 2010) and
Simsek (2010), focus on asset-based leverage (as defined in this paper).
Not all these models actually make room for endogenous leverage. Often an
ad hoc behavioral rule is postulated. To mention just a few, Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009) assume a VAR rule. Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Vayanos and
Wang (2012) assume a max min rule that prevents default. Some other papers like
Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) and Mendoza (2010) assumed a fixed LT V .
In other papers leverage is endogenous, though the modeling strategy is not as
in our paper. In the corporate finance approach of Bernanke and Gertler (1986),
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Acharya and Viswanathan (2011) and Adrian and Shin
(2010) the endogeneity of leverage relies on asymmetric information and moral hazard
problems between lenders and borrowers. Asymmetric information is important in
loan markets for which the borrower is also a manager who exercises control over the
value of the collateral. Lenders may insist that the manager puts up a portion of
7

the investment himself in order to maintain his skin in the game. The recent crisis,
however, was centered not in the corporate bond world, where managerial control is
central, but in the mortgage securities market, where the buyer/borrower generally
has no control or specialized knowledge over the cash flows of the collateral. Finally,
in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011) leverage is endogenous but is determined not
by collateral capacities but by agents risk aversion; it is a “demand-determined”
leverage that would be the same without collateral requirements. The time series
movements of LT V come there from movements in volatility because the added
uncertainty makes borrowers more scared of investing, rather than from reducing
the debt capacity of the collateral or making lenders more scared to lend.

3

The Irrelevance of Actual Default in a Simple
Model of Debt.

3.1

Model

In order to understand the upcoming No-Default Theorem more easily, we restrict
attention in this section to two periods, one asset, and non-contingent debt contracts.
3.1.1

Time and Assets

We begin with a simple two-period general equilibrium model, with time t = 0, 1.
Uncertainty is represented by different states of nature s ∈ S including a root s = 0.
We denote the time of s by t(s), so t(0) = 0 and t(s) = 1, ∀s ∈ ST , the set of terminal
nodes of S. Suppose there is a single perishable consumption good c and one asset
Y which pays dividends ds of the consumption good in each final state s ∈ ST . We
call the asset a financial asset because it gives no direct utility to investors, and pays
the same dividends no matter who owns it. Financial assets are valued exclusively
because they pay dividends. Houses are not financial assets because they give utility
to their owners. Neither is land if its output depends on who owns it and tills it.
3.1.2

Investors

Each investor h ∈ H is characterized by a utility, uh , a discount factor, δh , and subjective probabilities, γsh , s ∈ ST . We assume that the utility function for consumption

8

in each state s ∈ S, uh : R+ → R, is differentiable, concave, and monotonic.6 The
expected utility to agent h is
X

U h = uh (c0 ) + δh

γsh uh (cs ).

(1)

s∈ST

Investor h’s endowment of the consumption good is denoted by ehs ∈ R+ in each
state s ∈ S. His endowment of the only asset Y at time 0 is y0h∗ ∈ R+ . We assume
P
P
that the consumption good is present, h∈H eh0 > 0, h∈H (ehs + ds y0h∗ ) > 0, ∀s ∈ ST .
3.1.3

Collateral and Debt.

We take the consumption good as numeraire and denote the price of Y at time 0
by p. A debt contract j promises j > 0 units of consumption good in each final
state backed by one unit of asset Y serving as collateral. The terms of the contract
are summarized by the ordered pair (j · e
1, 1). The first component, j · e
1 ∈ RST (the
vector of j’s with dimension equal to the number of final states), denotes the (noncontingent) promise. The second component, 1, denotes the one unit of the asset Y
used as collateral. Let J be the set of all such available debt contracts.
The price of contract j is πj . An investor can borrow πj today by selling the
debt contract j in exchange for a promise of j tomorrow. Let ϕj be the number of
contracts j traded at time 0. There is no sign constraint on ϕj ; a positive (negative)
ϕj indicates the agent is selling (buying) |ϕj | contracts j or borrowing (lending)
|ϕj |πj .
We assume the loan is non-recourse, so the maximum a borrower can lose is his
collateral if he does not honor his promise: the actual delivery of debt contract j in
state s ∈ ST is min{j, ds }. If the promise is small enough that j ≤ ds , ∀s ∈ ST , then
the contract will not default. In this case its price defines a riskless rate of interest
(1 + rj ) = j/πj .
The Loan to Value (LT V ) associated to debt contract j is given by
LT Vj =
6

πj
.
p

(2)

All that matters for the No-Default Theorem is that the utility U h : R1+S → R depends only
on consumption (and not for example on portfolio holdings). The expected utility representation
is done for familiarity, and to emphasize that components such as probabilities or discount factors
can differ across agents.
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The margin requirement mj associated to debt contract j is 1 − LT Vj , and the
leverage associated to debt contract j is the inverse of the margin, 1/mj .
We define the average loan to value, LT V for asset Y , as the trade-value weighted
average of LT Vj across all debt contracts actively traded in equilibrium, and the
diluted average loan to value, LT V0Y (which includes assets with no leverage) by
P P
LT V

Y

h

= P P
h

3.1.4

j
j

max(0, ϕhj )πj
max(0, ϕhj )p

h
j max(0, ϕj )πj
P
= LT V0Y .
h
p
y
h 0∗

P P
h

≥

Budget Set

Given the asset and debt contract prices (p, (πj )j∈J ), each agent h ∈ H decides
consumption, c0 , asset holding, y, debt and contract trades, ϕj , at time 0, and also
consumption, cs , in each state s ∈ ST , in order to maximize utility (1) subject to the
budget set defined by
1+S
B h (p, π) = {(c, y, ϕ) ∈ R+
× R+ × RJ :

(c0 − eh0 ) + p(y − y0h∗ ) ≤
(cs − ehs ) ≤ yds −

P

j∈J

ϕj πj

P

j∈J

ϕj min(j, ds ), ∀s ∈ ST

P

j∈J

max(0, ϕj ) ≤ y}.

At time 0 expenditures on consumption and the asset, net of endowments, must
be financed by money borrowed, using the asset as collateral. In the final period, at
each state s, consumption net of endowments, can be at most equal to the dividend
payment minus debt repayment. Finally, those agents who borrow must hold the
required collateral at time 0.7
7

Notice that we are assuming that short selling of assets is not possible. So even with two
or more contracts, equilibrium might still be different from Arrow-Debreu. We do not think the
assumption of no-short selling is implausible. It is impossible to short sell many assets in the real
world, though the CDS market is beginning to change that. In Fostel-Geanakoplos (2012b) we
investigate the significance of CDS for asset pricing.
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3.1.5

Collateral Equilibrium

A Collateral Equilibrium is a set consisting of an asset price, debt contract prices, individual consumptions, asset holdings, and contract trades ((p, π), (ch , y h , ϕh )h∈H ) ∈
1+S
J
) × (R+
× R+ × RJ )H such that
(R+ × R+
1.

P

h
h∈H (c0

2.

P

h
h
h∈H (cs − es ) =

3.

P

h∈H (y

4.

P

h∈H

h

− eh0 ) = 0.
P

h∈H

y h ds , ∀s ∈ ST .

− y0h∗ ) = 0.

ϕhj = 0, ∀j ∈ J.

5. (ch , y h , ϕhj ) ∈ B h (p, π), ∀h
(c, y, ϕ) ∈ B h (p, π) ⇒ U h (c) ≤ U h (ch ), ∀h.

Markets for the consumption good in all states clear, assets and promises clear
in equilibrium at time 0, and agents optimize their utility in their budget sets. As
shown by Geanakoplos and Zame (1997), equilibrium in this model always exists
under the assumption we have made so far.
The set H of agents can be taken as finite (in which case we really have in
mind a continuum of agents of each of the types), or we might think of H = [0, 1]
as a continuum of distinct agents, in which case we must think of all the agent
characteristics as measurable functions of h. In the latter case we must think of
P
the summation
over agents as an integral over agents, and all the optimization
conditions as holding with Lebesgue measure one.

3.2

The Simple Binomial No-Default Theorem

Consider the situation in which there are only two terminal states, S = {0, U, D}.
Asset Y pays dU units of the consumption good in state s = U and 0 < dD < dU in
state s = D.8 Figure 1 depicts the asset payoff. Default occurs in equilibrium if and
only if some contract j with j > dD is positively traded. One might imagine that
8

Without loss of generality, dU ≥ dD . If dD = 0 or dD = dU , then the contracts are perfect
substitutes for the asset, so there is no point in trading them. Sellers of the contracts could simply
hold less of the asset and reduce their borrowing to zero while buyers of the contracts could buy
the asset instead. So we might as well assume 0 < dD < dU .
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some agents value the asset much more than others, say because they attach very
high probability γUh to the U state, or because they are more risk tolerant, or because
they have very low endowments ehU in the U state, or because they put a high value
δ h on the future. These agents might be expected to want to borrow a lot, promising
j > dD so as to get their hands on more money to buy more assets at time 0. Indeed
it is true that for j > j ∗ = dD , any agent can raise more money πj > πj∗ by selling
contract j rather than j ∗ . Nonetheless, as the following result shows, we can assume
without loss of generality that the only debt contract traded in equilibrium will be
the max min contract j ∗ , on which there is no default.

s=U	
  
dU	
  

s=0	
  

s=D	
  
dD	
  

Figure 1: Asset payoff description.

Simple Binomial No-Default Theorem:
Suppose that S = {0, U, D}, that Y is a financial asset, and that the max min
debt contract j ∗ = dD ∈ J. Then given any equilibrium ((p, π), (ch , y h , ϕh )h∈H ), we
can construct another equilibrium ((p, π), (ch , ȳ h , ϕ̄h )h∈H ) with the same asset and
contract prices and the same consumptions, in which j ∗ is the only debt contract
traded, ϕ̄hj = 0 if j 6= j ∗ . Hence equilibrium default can be taken to be zero, and
equilibrium LTV can be taken equal to

πj∗
p

=

12

dD /(1+rj ∗ )
p

=

dD /p
.
1+rj ∗

Proof:
The proof is organized in three steps.
1. Payoff Cone Lemma.
The portfolio of assets and contracts that any agent h holds in equilibrium
h
delivers payoff vector (wUh , wD
)which lies in the cone positively spanned by (dU −
∗
∗ ∗
j , 0) and (j , j ). The U Arrow security payoff (dU −j ∗ , 0) = (dU , dD )−(j ∗ , j ∗ )
can be obtained from buying the asset while simultaneously selling the max min
debt contract.
Any portfolio payoff (wU , wD ) is the sum of payoffs from individual holdings.
The possible holdings include debt contracts j > j ∗ , j = j ∗ , j < j ∗ , the asset,
and the asset bought on margin by selling some debt contract j. The debt
contracts and the asset all deliver at least as much in state U as in state D. So
does the leveraged purchase of the asset. In fact, buying the asset on margin
using any debt contract with dU > j ≥ j ∗ is effectively a way of buying the U
Arrow payoff (dU − j, 0). This can be seen in Figure 2.
In short, we have that the Arrow U security and the max min debt contract
positively span all the feasible payoff space, as shown in Figure 3.
2. State Pricing Lemma.
Let a > 0 be the price of the synthetic U Arrow security (created by the leveraged
purchase of the asset via the contract j ∗ ). Let b = πj∗ /j ∗ − a. Then if any
h
h
agent h holds a portfolio delivering (wUh , wD
), the portfolio costs awUh + bwD
.
In step (a) we find state prices for two securities: the asset and the max min
debt contract j ∗ . In step (b) we use the Payoff Cone Lemma to show that the
same state prices can be used to price any other debt contract j 6= j ∗ that is
traded in equilibrium. The cost of any portfolio is obtained as the sum of the
costs of its constituent parts.
p−π

∗

(a) Let a = dU −jj ∗ and b = πj∗ /j ∗ − a. Consider the max min debt contract
and the asset payoff shown in Figure 2. Then πj∗ = aj ∗ + bj ∗ and p =
adU + bdD .
Note first that
aj ∗ + bj ∗ = aj ∗ + (πj∗ /j ∗ − a)j ∗ = πj∗ .
13

U
Arrow U
security

Asset Y
Payoff

Family of debt contracts

dU
Debt contract promise j>j*
Debt contract j delivery
Debt contract promise j*
45o

dD

D

2	
  

Figure 2: Creating the U Arrow security.
Using the definitions of πj∗ , a and j ∗
adU + bdD − πj∗ = a(dU − j ∗ ) + b(dD − j ∗ ) = (p − πj∗ ) + 0.
And hence
adU + bdD = p.
(b) Suppose a debt contract j with j 6= j ∗ = dD is positively traded in equilibrium. Then πj = a · min{dU , j} + b · min{j ∗ , j}.
The actual delivery of contract j is given by (min{dU , j}, min{j ∗ , j}). In
case j ≤ j ∗ = dD , the contract fully delivers j in both states, proportionally to contract j ∗ . If j’s price exceeded πj ∗ (j/j ∗ ) = aj + bj, its buyers
should have bought j/j ∗ units of j ∗ instead. Similarly, if its price were
less than πj ∗ (j/j ∗ ) = aj + bj, its sellers should have sold j/j ∗ units of
j ∗ instead, which would have been feasible for them as it requires less
collateral.
We are left to consider the case in which j > j ∗ , shown in Figure 2. By
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Figure 3: Positive spanning.
the Payoff Cone Lemma, the actual delivery of contract j is in the positive
span of (dU − j ∗ , 0) and (j ∗ , j ∗ ):
(min{dU , j}, min{j ∗ , j}) = α(dU − j ∗ , 0) + β(j ∗ , j ∗ )
with α, β ≥ 0. Hence, α(dU −j ∗ )+βj ∗ = min{dU , j} and βj ∗ = min{j ∗ , j}.
None of the buyers would have purchased j unless
πj ≤ αa(dU − j ∗ ) + βπj ∗ = a(α(dU − j ∗ ) + βj ∗ ) + b(βj ∗ ) =
= a · min{dU , j} + b · min{j ∗ , j}.
On the other hand, any seller of contract j has entered into a double trade,
buying (or holding) the asset as collateral at the same time he sold contract
j, at a net cost of p − πj . Since any contract j > dU delivers exactly the
same way in both states as contract j = dU , we can now without loss of
generality restrict attention to contracts j with dD < j ≤ dU . Any agent
selling such a contract, while holding the required collateral, receives on
15

net dU − j in state U , and nothing in state D. He could have obtained
exactly the same net payoff by holding (dU − j)/(dU − j ∗ ) < 1 units of the
asset and selling (dU − j)/(dU − j ∗ ) < 1 units of contract j ∗ , at a net cost
of (p − πj ∗ )(dU − j)/(dU − j ∗ ). He should have done so unless
p − πj ≤ (p − πj ∗ )(dU − j)/(dU − j ∗ )
p − πj ≤ ([adU + bj ∗ ] − [(a + b)j ∗ ])(dU − j)/(dU − j ∗ )
p − πj ≤ a(dU − j ∗ )(dU − j)/(dU − j ∗ ) = a(dU − j)
adU + bj ∗ − πj ≤ a(dU − j)
aj + bj ∗ ≤ πj
a · min{dU , j} + b · min{j ∗ , j} ≤ πj .
Hence πj = a · min{dU , j} + b · min{j ∗ , j}.
3. Construction of the new default-free equilibrium
Define
h
(wUh , wD
) = y h (dU , dD ) −

X
(min(j, dU ), min(j, dD ))ϕhj .
j

h
wD

−
.
dU − dD
h
h
= [ȳ h dD − wD
]/j ∗ = ȳ h − wD
/j ∗ .

ȳ h =
ϕ̄hj∗

wUh

If in the original equilibrium, y h is replaced by ȳ h and ϕhj is replaced by 0 for
j 6= j ∗ and by ϕ̄hj∗ for j = j ∗ , and all prices and other individual choices are
left the same, then we still have an equilibrium.
(a) Agents are maximizing in the new equilibrium.
Note that ϕ̄hj∗ ≤ ȳ h , so this portfolio choice satisfies the collateral constraint.
Using the above definitions, the net payoff in state D is the same as in
the original equilibrium,
h
ȳ h dD − ϕ̄hj∗ j ∗ = wD
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and the same is also true for the net payoff in state U,
h
h
h
ȳ h dU − ϕ̄hj∗ j ∗ = ȳ h (dU − dD ) + wD
= (wUh − wD
) + wD
= wUh .
h
Hence the portfolio choice (ȳ h , ϕ̄hj∗ ) gives the same payoff (wUh , wD
). From
the Lemmas, the newly constructed portfolio must have the same cost as
well. Hence every agent is optimizing.

(b) Markets clear in the new equilibrium.
Summing over individuals we must get
X

ȳ h (dU , dD ) −

X

h

ϕ̄hj∗ (j ∗ , j ∗ ) =

h

X
X
XX
X
h
(wUh , wD
)=
y h (dU , dD )−
ϕhj (min(j, dU ), min(j, dD )) =
y h (dU , dD ).
h

h

h

j

h

The first equality follows from step (a), the second from the definition of
net payoffs in the original equilibrium, and the last equality follows from
P
the fact that h ϕhj = 0 in the original equilibrium for each contract j.
Hence we have that
X
X
ϕ̄hj∗ (j ∗ , j ∗ ) = 0.
(ȳ h − y h )(dU , dD ) −
h

h

By the linear independence of the vectors (dU , dD ) and (j ∗ , j ∗ ) we deduce
that
X

ȳ h =

h

X

X

yh

h

ϕ̄hj∗

= 0.

h

Hence markets clear. Finally, the formula for equilibrium LT V follows
from the fact that the promises are non-contingent, so that the max min
contract promises dD in both states, and from the definition of LT V . The
proof is complete.
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3.3

Simple Binomial State Pricing Theorem

We now call attention to an interesting corollary of the proof just given. By modifying
the equilibrium prices in the above construction for contracts that are not traded, we
can bring them into line with the state prices a, b defined in the proof of the Simple
Binomial No-Default Theorem, without affecting equilibrium. More concretely,
Simple Binomial State Pricing Theorem:
Suppose that S = {0, U, D}, that Y is a financial asset, and that the max min debt
contract j ∗ = dD ∈ J. Then given any equilibrium ((p, π), (ch , y h , ϕh )h∈H ), we can
construct another equilibrium ((p, π̄), (ch , ȳ h , ϕ̄h )h∈H ) with the same consumptions,
the same asset price and the same contract price for j ∗ , such that every asset and
contract is priced by state prices a > 0 and b > 0 which are uniquely defined if dU 6=
dD . That is, p = adU + bdD , and for every j ∈ J, π̄j = a · min{dU , j} + b · min{dD , j}.
Furthermore, j ∗ is the only debt contract positively traded, ϕ̄hj = 0 if j 6= j ∗ .
Proof:
The proof was nearly given in the proof of the Simple Binomial No-Default Theorem. It is straightforward to show that if a previously untraded contract has its
price adjusted into line with the state prices, then nothing is affected.

3.4

Discussion

The Simple Binomial No-Default Theorem shows that in any static binomial model
with a single financial asset, we can assume without loss of generality that the only
debt contract actively traded is the max min debt contract (on which there is no
default). Thus in static binomial models, leverage is endogenously determined in
equilibrium by the Value at Risk equal zero rule, assumed by many other papers
in the literature. Furthermore, by the Simple Binomial State Pricing Theorem, all
the contracts (which may be arbitrarily numerous) can be priced by just two state
prices. These two theorems make it extremely easy to compute collateral equilibrium
for simple binomial collateral economies with debt contracts.
The Binomial No-Default Theorem does not say that equilibrium is unique, only
that each equilibrium can be replaced by another with the same asset price and the
same consumption by each agent, in which there is no default. Thus potential default
has a dramatic effect on equilibrium, but actual default does not.
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The Binomial No-Default Theorem has a sort of Modigliani-Miller feel to it. But
the theorem does not assert that the debt-equity ratio is irrelevant. The theorem
shows that if we start from any equilibrium, we can move to an equivalent equilibrium
in which only max min debt is traded. If the original equilibrium had default, in the
new equilibrium, leverage will be lower. Thus starting from a situation of default,
the theorem does say that leverage can be lowered over a range until the point of
no default, while leaving all investors indifferent. The theorem does not say that
starting from a max min equilibrium, one can construct another equilibrium with
still lower leverage, or even with higher leverage. Modigliani-Miller does not fully
hold in our model because issuers of debt must hold collateral, and because we do
not allow short selling of the asset. Our argument relies on positive spanning, not
spanning. In Section 5 we give an example with a unique equilibrium in which every
borrower leverages to the max min, but no agent would be indifferent to leveraging
any less. In that example Modigliani-Miller completely fails.
The Simple Binomial No-Default Theorem not only shows that actual default
is irrelevant, but also provides a very simple prediction about equilibrium leverage.
According to the theorem, equilibrium LT V for the family of non-contingent debt
contracts is the ratio of the worst case return of the asset divided by the riskless rate
of interest.
dD /p
dD /(1 + r)
=
.
LT V =
p
(1 + r)
Equilibrium leverage depends on current and future asset prices, but is otherwise
independent of the utilities or the endowments of the agents. In the extreme case
when the volatility of asset returns is zero, leverage reaches its maximum of 100%.9
Given a collection of assets with the same price, the asset whose future value has the
least bad downside can be leveraged the most.10 The No-Default Theorem suggests
that one reason leverage might have plummeted from 2006-2009 is because the worst
case return that lenders imagined got much worse.
Collateralized loans always fall into two categories. In the first category, a borrower is not designating all the assets he holds as collateral for his loans. In this case
9

This would be the case in any model without uncertainty in which the asset can be costlessly
seized in case of default, without moral hazard frictions.
10
Suppose all the assets can be priced by the state prices a for U and b for D. Define the volatility
of a dollar of period one asset as the variance of its second period price plus dividend, computed
with respect to the probabilities (1 + r)a and (1 + r)b. Then the asset with the highest volatility
can be leveraged the least. Unfortunately even with two states, this volatility rule does not always
work, because, as we shall see, different assets may require different state prices to value them.
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he would not want to borrow any more at the going interest rates even if he did not
need to put up collateral (but was still required, by threat of punishment, to deliver
the same payoffs he would had he put up the collateral). His demand for loans is
then explained by conventional text book considerations of risk and return. If all
borrowers are in this case, then the rate of interest clears the loan market without
consideration of default. In the second category, some or all the borrowers might be
posting all their assets as collateral. In this case of scarce collateral, the loan market
clears at a level determined by the spectre of default. Our contribution is to have
proved that in binomial models with financial assets, the equilibrium LT V can be
taken to be the same easy to compute number, no matter which category the loan
is in.
The No-Default Theorem shows that the equilibrium LT V for each family of
contracts is determined by asset values, otherwise independent of the preferences or
endowments of the agents. If collateral is scarce, and agents are borrowing against
all of it, then total borrowing is also determined independently from agent characteristics. On the other hand, if nobody wants to borrow beyond the debt capacity
of the asset, then the collateral requirements are irrelevant, and debt is determined
by the preferences of the agents in the economy, just as in models without collateral. Nonetheless, as the No-Default Theorem states, the LT V can be taken to be
the same as that determined by the debt capacity. In short, there are two regimes.
First, when all the assets fall into the first category, we can say that the debt in the
economy is determined by the demand for loans. When all the assets and borrowers
fall into the second category, we can say the debt in the economy is determined by
the supply of credit, that is, by the maximum debt capacity of the assets.
The distinction between plentiful and scarce capital all supporting loans at the
same LT V suggests that is useful to keep track of a second kind of leverage that we
call diluted leverage. Consider the following example: if the asset is worth $100 and
its worst case payoff determines a debt capacity of $80, then in equilibrium we can
assume all debt loans written against this asset will have LT V equal to 80%. If an
agent who owns the asset only wants to borrow $30, then she could just as well put
up only three eights of the asset as collateral, since that would ensure there would be
no default. The LTV would then again be $30/$37.50 or 80%. Hence, it is useful to
consider what we call diluted LT V , namely the ratio of the loan amount to the total
value of the asset, even if some of the asset is not used as collateral. The diluted
LT V in this example is 30%, because the denominator includes the $62.50 of asset
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that was not used as collateral.
In the Simple Binomial State Pricing Theorem, the state prices a, b are like Arrow
prices. Their existence implies that there are no arbitrage possibilities in trading
the asset and the contracts. Even a trader who had infinite wealth and who was
allowed to make promises without putting up any required collateral could not find
a trade that made money in some state without ever losing money. However, the
equilibrium may not be an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, even though the state prices
are uniquely defined. We shall see an example with unique state prices but Pareto
inferior consumptions (coming from the collateral constraints) in Section 5.
We shall see in Section 4 that the Simple Binomial No-Default Theorem continues
to hold in more complicated binomial models, but the Simple Binomial State Pricing
Theorem does not extend to more complex binomial models. In Section 5 we give
an example. These subtler binomial models can still be solved fairly easily by the
knowledge that actual default is irrelevant, but the pricing of assets and contracts
can become more interesting.
There are two key assumptions in the Binary No-Default Theorem. First, we
only consider financial assets, that is, assets that do not give direct utility at time 0
to their holders, and which yield dividends at time 1 that are independent from who
holds them at time 0. Second, we assume that the tree is binary.
In the first step of the proof, the Payoff Cone Lemma shows that the max min
promise plus the U Arrow security (obtained by buying the asset while selling the
max min debt contract), positively spans the cone of all feasible portfolio payoffs. The
assumption of two states is crucial. If there were three states, it might be impossible
for a portfolio holder to reproduce his original net payoffs from a portfolio in which
he can only hold the asset and buy or issue the max min debt.
In the second step of the proof, the State Pricing lemma shows that any two
portfolios that give the same payoffs in the two states must cost the same. One
interesting feature of the proof is that it demonstrates the existence of state prices
(that price all the assets) even though short-selling is not allowed. In general, if
an instrument (asset or bond) C has payoffs that are a positive combination of the
payoffs from instruments A and B, then the price of C cannot be above the positive
combination of the prices of A and B. Any buyer could improve on buying C by
combining the purchase of A and B. This logic gives an upper-bound for prices of all
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traded instruments. On the other hand, the price of C could be less than the price of
the positive combination of A and B because there may be sellers of this instrument,
but no agent interested in buying it, and the sellers cannot split C into A and B.
Nonetheless, we show that we can also get a lower-bound for the price of C. The
reason is that in our model, the sellers of the debt contract must own the collateral,
and hence on net are in fact buyers. What they buy is a positive linear combination
of A and B, which gives us an upper bound for the price of what they buy, and hence
the missing lower bound on what they sell. In short, the crucial argument in the
proof is that sellers are actually buyers of something else that is in the payoff cone.
As we will see later, when there are multiple assets, or multiple kinds of loans on
the same asset, the sellers of a bond in one family may not be purchasing something
in the payoff cone of another family. Each family may require different state prices.
That is why the No-Default Theorem holds more generally, but the State Pricing
Theorem does not.
In the third step of the proof we use both lemmas to show that in equilibrium
each agent is indifferent to replacing his portfolio with another such that on each
unit of collateral that he holds, he either leverages to the maximum amount without
risk of default, or does not leverage at all. The idea is as follows. If in the original
equilibrium the investor leveraged his asset purchases less than the max min, he
could always leverage some of his holdings to the max min, and the others not at
all. If in the original equilibrium the investor was selling more debt than the max
min, defaulting in the D state, then he could instead reduce his asset holdings and
his debt sales to the max min level per unit of asset held, and still end up buying the
same amount of the U Arrow security.11 Let the original buyer of the original risky
bond buy instead all of the new max min debt plus all the asset that the original
risky bond seller no longer holds. By construction the total holdings of the asset
is unchanged, and the total holdings of debt is zero, as before. Furthermore, by
construction, the seller of the bond has the same portfolio payoff as before, so he is
still optimizing. Since the total payoff is just equal to the dividends from the asset,
and that is unchanged, the buyer of the bond must also end up with the same payoffs
in the two states, so he is optimizing as well.
It is important to realize that the new portfolio may involve each agent holding
a new amount of the collateral asset, while getting the same payoff from his new
11
If he continued to hold the same assets while reducing his debt to the max min per asset, then
he would end up with more of the U Arrow security.
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portfolio of assets and contracts. Agents are indifferent to switching to the new
portfolio because of the crucial assumption that the asset is a financial asset. If the
collateral were housing or productive land for example, the theorem would not hold;
it might well be that even with only two states agents would leverage in equilibrium
to the point where they would default in one of the states (as shown in an example
in Geanakoplos (1997, 2010)).
Finally, it is worth noting that in moving from an old equilibrium in which only
contracts j < j ∗ are traded to the new max min equilibrium, diluted leverage stays
the same, but leverage on the margined assets rises. In moving from an old equilibrium with default in which a contract j > j ∗ is traded to the new max min
equilibrium, diluted leverage strictly declines, and leverage on the margined assets
also declines.

4

The Irrelevance of Actual Default in a General
Binomial Model of Endogenous Leverage.

In this section we show that the irrelevance of actual default is a much more general phenomenon, as long as we maintain our two key assumptions: financial assets
and binary payoffs. We shall now present a model in which the conclusion of no
default with endogenous leverage still holds even though we allow for the following
extensions.
1. Arbitrary contracts.
Previously we assumed that the only possible contract promise was non-contingent
debt. Now we allow for arbitrary promises (jU , jD ), provided that the max
min version of the promise (λ̄jU , λ̄jD ) where λ̄ = max{λ ∈ R+ : λ(jU , jD ) ≤
(dU , dD )} is also available.
2. Multiple kinds of contracts.
Not only can the promises be contingent, there can also be many different
(non-colinear) types of promises co-existing. See Figure 4.
3. Multiple assets.
We can allow for many different kinds of collateral at the same time, each one
backing many (possibly) non-collinear promises.
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Figure 4: Different types of contingent contracts
4. Production and degrees of durability.
The model already implicitly includes the storage technology for the asset.
Now we allow the consumption goods to be durable, though their durability
may be imperfect. We also allow for intra-period production. In fact, we allow
for general production sets, provided that the collateral stays sequestered, and
prevented from being used as an input.
5. Multiple goods.
Unlike our previous model, in each state of nature there will be more than one
consumption good.
6. Multiple periods.
We will extend our model to a dynamic model with an arbitrarily (finite)
number of periods.
7. Multiple states of nature.
In each point in time, we will allow for multiple states of nature, as long as
each (asset payoff, contract promise) pair takes on at most two values.
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4.1
4.1.1

Model
Time and Assets

Uncertainty is represented by the existence of different states of nature in a finite
tree s ∈ S including a root s = 0, and terminal nodes s ∈ ST . We denote the time
of s as t(s), so t(0) = 0. Each state s 6= 0 has a unique immediate predecessor s∗ ,
and each non-terminal node s ∈ S\ST has a set S(s) of immediate successors.
Suppose there are L = {1, ..., L} consumption goods ` and K = {1, ..., K} financial assets k which pay dividends dks ∈ RL+ of the consumption goods in each state
s ∈ S. The dividends dks are distributed at state s to the investors who owned the
asset in state s∗ .
L
Finally, qs ∈ R+
denotes the vector of consumption goods prices in state s,
K
whereas ps ∈ R+ denotes the asset prices in state s.

4.1.2

Investors

Each investor h ∈ H is characterized by a utility, uh , a discount factor, δh , and
subjective probabilities γsh denoting the probability of reaching state s from its
predecessor s∗ , for all s ∈ S\{0}. We assume that the utility function for consumption
L
→ R, is differentiable, concave, and weakly monotonic
in each state s ∈ S, uh : R+
(more of every good is strictly better). The expected utility to agent h is
U h = uh (c0 ) +

X

t(s)

δh γ̄sh uh (cs ).

(3)

s∈S\0

where γ̄sh is the probability of reaching s fom 0 (obtained by taking the product of
γσh over all nodes σ on the path (0, s] from 0 to s).
L
Investor h’s endowment of the consumption good is denoted by ehs ∈ R+
in each
h
K
state s ∈ S. His endowment of the assets at the beginning of time 0 is y0∗ ∈ R+
(agents have initial endowment of assets only at the beginning). We assume that the
P
consumption goods are all present, h∈H (ehs + ds y0h∗ ) >> 0, ∀s ∈ S.

4.1.3

Production

We allow for durable consumption goods (inter-period production) and for intraperiod production. For each s ∈ S\{0}, let Fsh : RL+ → RL+ be a concave inter-period
25

production function connecting a vector of consumption goods at state s∗ that h is
consuming with the vector of consumption goods it becomes in state s. In contrast
to consumption goods, it is assumed that all financial assets are perfectly durable
from one period to the next, independent of who owns them.
For each s ∈ S, let Zsh ⊂ RL+K denote the set of feasible intra-period production
for agent h in state s. Notice, that assets and consumption goods can enter as
inputs and outputs of the intra-period production process. Inputs appear as negative
components of zi < 0 of z ∈ Z h , and outputs as positive components zi > 0 of z.
4.1.4

Collateral and Contracts

L
Contract j ∈ J is a contract that promises the consumption vector js0 ∈ R+
in
0
each state s . Each contract j defines its issue state s(j), and the asset k(j) used
as collateral. We denote the set of contracts with issue state s backed by one unit
of asset k by Jsk ⊂ J. We suppose that each contract j ∈ Jsk delivers only in the
immediate successor states of s, i.e. js0 = 0 unless s0 ∈ S(s). Contracts are defined
extensively by their payment in each successor state. Notice that this definition of
contract allows for promises with different baskets of consumption goods in different
S
S
states. Finally, Js = k Jsk and J = s∈S\ST Js .

The price of contract j in state s(j) is πs(j)j . An investor can borrow πs(j)j at s(j)
L
by selling contract j, that is by promising js0 ∈ R+
in each s0 ∈ S(s(j)), provided he
holds one unit of asset k(j) as collateral.
Since the maximum a borrower can lose is his collateral if he does not honor his
promise, the actual delivery of contract j in states s0 ∈ S(s(j)) is min{qs0 ·js0 , ps0 k(j) +
qs0 · dks0 }.
The Loan-to-Value LT Vj associated to contract j in state s(j) is given by
LT Vj =

πs(j)j
.
ps(j)k

(4)

As before, the margin mj associated to contract j in state s(j) is 1 − LT Vj .
Leverage associated to contract j in state s(j) is the inverse of the margin, 1/mj and
moves monotonically with LT Vj .
Finally, as in Section 3, we define the average loan to value, LT V for asset k, as
the trade-value weighted average of LT Vj across all debt contracts actively traded
26

in equilibrium that use asset k as collateral, and the diluted average loan to value,
LT V0k (which includes assets with no leverage) by
h

j

max(0, ϕhj )πs(j)j

h

j

max(0, ϕhj )ps(j)k

P P
k

LT V = P P
4.1.5

h
j max(0, ϕj )πs(j)j
P
= LT V0k .
h
p
y
h 0∗ s(j)k

P P
h

≥

Budget Set

Given consumption prices, asset prices, and contract prices (q, p, π), each agent h ∈ H
choses intra-period production plans of goods and assets, z = (zc , zy ), consumption,
c, asset holdings, y, and contract sales/purchases ϕ in order to maximize utility (3)
subject to the budget set defined by
SL
SK
B h (q, p, π) = {(zc , zy , c, y, ϕ) ∈ RSL × RSK × R+
× R+
× (RJs )s∈S\ST : ∀s

qs · (cs − ehs − Fsh (cs∗ ) − zsc ) + ps · (ys − ys∗ − zsy ) ≤
qs ·

P

k∈K

dks ys∗ k +

P

j∈Js

ϕj πj −

P

k∈K

P

j∈Jsk∗

ϕj min{qs · js , psk + qs · dks };

zs ∈ Zsh ;
P

j∈Jsk

max(0, ϕj ) ≤ ysk , ∀k}.

In each state s, expenditures on consumption minus endowments plus any produced consumption good (either from the previous period or produced in the current
period), plus total expenditures on assets minus asset holdings carried over from
previous periods and asset output from the intra-period technology, can be at most
equal to total asset deliveries plus the money borrowed selling contracts, minus the
payments due at s from contracts sold in the past. Intra-period production is feasible.
Finally, those agents who borrow must hold the required collateral.
4.1.6

Collateral Equilibrium

A Collateral Equilibrium in this economy is a set of consumption good prices, financial asset prices and contract prices, production and consumption decisions, and
financial decisions on assets and contract holdings ((q, p, π), (z h , ch , y h , ϕh )h∈H ) ∈
Js
L
K
SL
SK
(R+
)s∈S × (R+
× R+
)s∈S\ST × (RS(L+K) × R+
× R+
× (RJs )s∈S\ST )H such that
1.

h
h
h
h
h∈H (cs − es − Fs (cs∗ ) − zsc ) =

P

P

h∈H
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P

k∈K

ysh∗ k dks , ∀s.

2.

P

3.

P

h
h∈H (ys

h∈H

h
− ysh∗ − zsy
) = 0, ∀s.

ϕhj = 0, ∀j ∈ Js , ∀s.

4. (z h , ch , y h , ϕh ) ∈ B h (q, p, π), ∀h
(z, c, y, ϕ) ∈ B h (q, p, π) ⇒ U h (c) ≤ U h (ch ), ∀h.

Markets for consumption, assets and promises clear in equilibrium and agents
optimize their utility in their budget set.

4.2

A More General No-Default Theorem

It turns out that we can still assume no default in equilibrium without loss of generality in this much more general context as the following theorem shows.
Binomial No-Default Theorem:
Suppose that S is a binomial tree, that is S(s)={sU,sD} for each s ∈ S\ST .
Suppose that all assets are financial assets. Suppose that every contract is a one
period contract. Let ((q, p, π), (z h , ch , y h , ϕh )h∈H ) be an equilibrium. Suppose that
for any state s ∈ S\ST , any asset k ∈ K, and any contract j ∈ Jsk , the max
min promise (λ̄jsU , λ̄jsD ) is also available to be traded , where λ̄ = max{λ ∈ R+ :
λ(qsU · jsU , qsD · jsD ) ≤ (psU k + qsU · dsU , psDk + qsD · dsD )}. Then we can construct
another equilibrium ((q, p, π), (z h , ch , ȳ h , ϕ̄h )h∈H ) with the same consumption, asset
and contract prices and the same production and consumption choices, in which only
max min contracts are traded.
Proof:
The proof of the Simple Binomial No-Default Theorem can be applied in this more
general context state by state and ray by ray. Take any s ∈ S\ST and any asset
k ∈ K. Partition Jsk into Jsk (r1 )∪...∪Jsk (rn ) where the ri are distinct rays (µi , νi ) ∈ R2+
of norm 1 such that j ∈ Jsk (ri ) if and only if (qsU · jsU , qsD · jsD ) = λ(µi , νi ) for some
λ > 0. For each agent h ∈ H, consider the portfolio (y h (s, k, i), ϕh (s, k, i)) defined by
ϕhj (s, k, i) = ϕhsj if j ∈ Jsk (ri ) and 0 otherwise.
X
y h (s, k, i) =
max(0, ϕhsj ).
j∈Jsk (ri )
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Denote the portfolio payoffs in each state by
wUh (s, k, i) = y h (s, k, i)[psU k + qsU dksU ] −

X

ϕhj (s, k, i) min(qsU · jsU , psU k + qsU dksU ).

j∈Jsk (ri )
h
wD
(s, k, i) = y h (s, k, i)[psDk + qsD dksD ] −

X

ϕhj (s, k, i) min(qsD · jsD , psDk + qsD dksD ).

j∈Jsk (ri )

If

psU k + qsU dksU
µi
<
.
νi
psDk + qsD dksD

then the combination of the U Arrow security (which can be obtained by buying the
asset k while borrowing on the max min contract of type (s, k, i)) and the max min
h
contract of type (s, k, i) positively spans (wUh (s, k, i), wD
(s, k, i)). Thus we can apply
the proof of the Simple Binomial No-Default Theorem to replace all the above trades
of contracts in Jsk (ri ) with a single trade of the max min contract of type (s, k, i). If
qsU k + psU dksU
µi
>
νi
qsDk + psD dksD
then exactly the same logic of the Simple Binomial No-Default Theorem applies, but
with the D Arrow security instead of the U Arrow security. If there is equality in the
above comparison, then the contract and the asset are perfect substitutes, so there
is no need to trade the contracts in the family at all. This concludes the proof.

4.3

Discussion

The main idea of the proof is to apply the simple proof of Section 3 state by state
to each asset and each homogeneous family of promises using the asset as collateral.
It may now be the case that sometimes the payoff cone is given by the positive span
of the max min of the family and the D Arrow security, instead of the U Arrow
security. But the logic of the argument stays completely unaltered.
The same proof applies even if there are more than two successor states, provided
that for each financial asset the states can be partitioned into two subsets on each of
which the collateral value (including dividends of the asset) and the promise value
of each contract written on the asset are constant.
The No-Default Theorem can also be extended to contracts with longer maturities. Suppose all the contracts written on some financial asset come due in the same
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period and that the states in that period can be partitioned into two subsets on each
of which the collateral value (including dividends of the asset) and the promise value
of each contract written on the asset are constant. Suppose also that the financial
asset used as collateral cannot be traded or used for production purposes before maturity. Then the proof of the Binomial No-Default Theorem shows that without loss
of generality we can assume no default in equilibrium.
Finally, notice that for each ray, say ri , we obtain (by the same logic as before),
state prices ai and bi . However, they need not be the same as the state prices
obtained when the argument is applied to a different ray, say rj . That is why,
though the No-Default Theorem still holds, the State Pricing theorem does not. We
will give examples of this in the next section.

5

Examples

In this section we study examples of two-period economies extensively used in the
financial literature: i) CAPM investors with differences in risk aversion or differences
in endowments, and ii) a continuum of risk neutral agents with heterogeneous beliefs.
The examples illustrate when the No-Default and State Pricing theorems hold and
when they fail.

5.1

Example 1: Binomial CAPM

We present two binomial examples with one financial asset in which the No-Default
Theorem and the State Pricing Theorem hold.
We assume one perishable consumption good and one asset which pays dividends
dU > dD of the consumption good. Consider two types of mean-variance investors,
P
h = T, A, characterized by utilities U h = uh (c0 ) + s∈ST γs uh (cs ), where uh (cs ) =
cs − 21 αh c2s , s ∈ {0, U, D}. Agents do not discount the future. Agents have an initial
endowment of the asset, y0h∗ , h = T, A. They also have endowment of the consumption
good in each state, ehs , ∀s, h = T, A. It is assumed that all contract promises are of
the form (j, j), j ∈ J, each backed by one unit of the asset as collateral. Agents
will never deliver on a promise beyond the value of the collateral since we assume
non-recourse loans.
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Example 1.1 would satisfy all the assumptions of the classical CAPM provided
that we assumed agents always kept their promises, without the need of posting
collateral, and so would example 1.2 (extended to untraded endowments). We will
present collateral equilibria which illustrate our theorems and the differences from
classical CAPM.
5.1.1

Example 1.1: CAPM with Differences in Risk Aversion.

Agents in this case have different levels of risk aversion, so that αT < αA . Suppose
agents each own one unit of the asset, y0h∗ = 1, h = T, A. Suppose consumption good
A A
endowments are given by eT = (eT0 , (eTU , eTD )) = (1, (1, 1)) and eA = (eA
0 , (eU , eD )) =
(1, (1, 1)). Utility parameters are given by, γU = γD = .5 and αT = .05 and αA = .1.
Finally, asset payoffs are dU = 1 and dD = .2.
Table 1. Collateral Equilibrium with No Default:
Variable
Notation
Asset Price
p
State Price
a
State Price
b
Max min Contract Price
πj ∗
Leverage
LT Vj ∗

Prices and Leverage.
Value
0.5590
0.4585
0.5021
0.1921
0.3437

According to the Simple Binomial No-Default Theorem, in searching for equilibrium we never need to look beyond the max min promise j ∗ = .2, for which there
will be no default. Tables 1 and 2 present this max min collateral equilibrium. The
tolerant agents buy most of the asset in the economy, y T = 1.8372, and use all of
their holdings as collateral, leveraging via the max min contract, that is, by promising (.2)(1.8372) in both states U and D. The risk averse investors sell most of their
asset endowment and lend to the more tolerant investors, that is, by buying the
promises.12
12
To find the equilibrium we guess the regime first and we solve for three variables, p, πj∗ and φj∗ ,
a system of three equations. The first equation is the first order condition for lending corresponding
A A
q (1−αA cA
U )dD +qD (1−α cD )dD
to the risk averse investor:π = U
.The second equation is the first order
1−αA cA
0
condition of the tolerant investor for purchasing the asset via the max min contract, p − π =
T T
qU (1−αT cT
U )(dU −dD )+qD (1−α cD )(dD −dD )
. The third equation is the first order condition for the risk
1−αT cT
0

γ (1−αA cA )d +γ (1−αA cA )d

U
D
U
U
D
averse investor for holding the asset, p = U
. Finally, we check that the
1−αA cA
0
regime is genuine, confirming that the tolerant investor really wants to leverage to the max, for this
T T
γ (1−αT cT
U )dD +γD (1−α cD )dD
to be the case, π > U
.
1−αT cT
0
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Table 2. Collateral Equilibrium with No Default: Allocations.
Asset and Collateral
Asset y
Contracts ϕj ∗
Tolerant
1.8372
1.8372
Averse
0.1628
−1.8372
Consumption
s=0
s=1
s=2
Tolerant
0.8850
2.4698
1.000
Averse
1.1150
1.5302
1.400
By the Simple Binomial State Pricing Theorem, all the contracts j 6= j ∗ , as well
as j = j ∗ , can be priced by state prices a = 0.4585 and b = 0.5021. As mentioned
before, by the No-Default Theorem, we do not need to investigate trading in any of
the contracts j 6= j ∗ . Indeed it is easy to check that this is a genuine equilibrium,
and that no agent would wish to trade any of these contracts j 6= j ∗ at the prices
given by a, b. Every agent who leverages chooses to sell the same max min contract,
hence asset leverage and contract leverage are the same and described in the table.
This equilibrium is essentially unique, but not strictly unique. In fact, it is easy
to check that there is another equilibrium with default as shown in Tables 3 and 4, in
which the tolerant agents borrow by selling the contract j = .2651 > j ∗ = .2. In the
default equilibrium, leverage is higher and the asset holdings of the borrowers are
higher (so diluted leverage is much higher). They borrow more money. However, as
guaranteed by the Simple Binomial Default Theorem, in both equilibria consumption
and asset and contract prices are the same: actual default is irrelevant.
Table 3. Collateral Equilibrium with Default: Prices and Leverage.
Variable
Notation Value
Asset Price
p
0.5590
Promise
j
0.2651
Contract j Price
πj
0.2219
Leverage
LT Vj ∗
0.3969
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Table 4. Collateral Equilibrium with Default: Allocations.
Asset and Collateral
Asset y
Collateral ϕj
Tolerant
2
2
Averse
0
−2
Consumption
s=0
s=1
s=2
Tolerant
0.8850
2.4698
1.000
Averse
1.1150
1.5302
1.400
Between these two equilibria, the Modigliani-Miller Theorem holds; there is an
indeterminacy of debt issuance in equilibrium. However, leverage cannot be reduced
below the max min contract level. If the risk tolerant agents were forced to issue still
less debt, they would rise in anger. Thus in this example, the No-Default Theorem
holds while the Modigliani-Miller Theorem fails beyond a limited range.
Finally, the collateral equilibria do not correspond with the Arrow-Debreu Equilibria or the classical CAPM shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Arrow-Debreu and CAPM equilibrium.
Asset Price
p
0.5629
State Price
pU
0.4643
State Price
pD
0.4929
Consumption
s=0
s=1
s=2
Tolerant
0.8951
2.2598
1.1681
Averse
1.1049
1.7402
1.2319
CAPM Portfolios: Market
Bond
Tolerant
0.6823 −0.4695
Averse
0.3177
0.4695
State prices in collateral equilibrium are different from the state prices in ArrowDebreu equilibrium. The asset price in complete markets is slightly higher than in
collateral equilibrium. Finally, investors hold shares in the market portfolio (4, 2.4)
(aggregate endowment) and in the riskless asset (1, 1).

33

5.1.2

Example 1.2: CAPM with Differences in Wealth.

Agents in this case have different wealth. Consider the same CAPM model as before
but with the following parameter values. Suppose agents each own one unit of
the asset, y0h∗ = 1, h = T, A. Suppose consumption good endowments are given
A A
by eT = (eT0 , (eTU , eTD )) = (1, (1, 5)) and eA = (eA
0 , (eU , eD )) = (3, (5, 5)). Utility
parameters are given by, γU = γD = .5 and αT = .1 and αA = .1. Finally, asset
payoffs are again dU = 1 and dD = .2. In this example agent T has a tremendous
desire to buy U Arrow securities and present consumption, and to sell D Arrow
securities. But he is limited by the restriction to non-contingent contract promises
(j, j).
Tables 6 and 7 present the max min collateral equilibrium. In the collateral
equilibrium type-T agents buy all the asset in the economy and use all of their
holdings as collateral, leveraging via the max min contract. On the other hand,
type-A investors sell all their asset endowment and lend.
Table 6. Collateral Equilibrium with No Default:
Variable
Notation
Asset Price
p
State Price
a
State Price
b
Max min Contract Price
πj ∗
Leverage
LT Vj ∗

Prices and Leverage.
Value
0.4572
0.4027
0.2725
0.1350
0.2952

Table 7. Collateral Equilibrium with No Default: Allocations.
Asset and Collateral
Asset y
Contracts ϕj ∗
Tolerant
2
2
Averse
0
−2
Consumption
s=0
s=1
s=2
Tolerant
0.8122
2.6
5
Averse
3.1872
5.4
5.4
Unlike the previous example the no-default equilibrium in this example is unique.
We cannot find another equilibrium involving default with borrowers issuing bigger
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promises, since there is not enough collateral in the economy. In this case, as before,
the collateral equilibrium does not coincide with the complete markets equilibrium
shown in Table 8. Unlike before, in this case the complete market asset price is lower
than the collateral equilibrium asset price.
Table 8. Arrow-Debreu and CAPM equilibrium.
Asset Price
p
0.4350
State Price
pU
0.3750
State Price
pD
0.3
Consumption
s=0
s=1
s=2
Tolerant
0.8024
3.1018
4.4814
Averse
3.1976
4.8982
5.9186
CAPM Porfolios Market
Bond
Tolerant
0.5749
1.4970
Averse
0.4251 −1.4970
It is interesting that the asset price in binomial collateral equilibrium can be
either higher or lower that the complete market price.

5.2

Example 2: Binomial Economy with Heterogeneous Priors and Two Assets

The following example taken from Fostel-Geanakoplos (2012b) shows how the NoDefault theorem holds but the State Pricing Theorem can fail even in a binomial
economy, once we add multiple assets.
There are two assets in the economy which produce dividends of the consumption
X
good at time 1. The riskless asset X produces dX
U = dD = 1 unit of the consumption
good in each state, and the risky asset Y produces dYU = 1 unit in state U and
0 < dYD < 1 unit of the consumption good in state D. For added simplicity, we
suppose that there is no consumption in period 0.
Each investor in the continuum h ∈ H = (0, 1) is risk neutral and characterized
by a linear utility for consumption of the single consumption good c at time 1, and
h
subjective probabilities, (γUh , γD
= 1 − γUh ). The expected utility to agent h ∈ H is
h
U h (cU , cD ) = γUh cU + γD
cD
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We shall suppose that γUh is strictly monotonically increasing and continuous in
h. Each investor h ∈ (0, 1) has an endowment of one unit of each asset at time 0 and
nothing else. Since only the output of Y depends on the state and 1 > dYD , higher
h denotes more optimism. Heterogeneity among the agents stems entirely from the
dependence of γUh on h.
In this economy we suppose that the risky asset Y can be used as collateral to
back any promise of the form (0, j). From the Binomial No-Default Theorem, we
know that any equilibrium is equivalent to one in which the only contract traded is
the max min contract j = dYD , that is, the contract deliveriyng (0, dYD ). The Y -payoff
cone positively spanned by the asset Y , the contracts j that use Y as collateral, and
the leveraged purchases of the asset Y , is all of R2+ . In effect, the asset Y can be
tranched into arbitrary contingent promises. Of course the promise (0, dYD ) is like a
D Arrow security, and by buying the asset Y and selling off the tranche (0, dYD ), any
agent can obtain the U Arrow security.
By the first part of the Simple State Pricing Lemma, any contract written on the
asset Y can be priced by state prices a and b. But this does not mean that other
assets whose payoffs lie in the Y −payoff cone must also be priced by these state
prices. It might well be that asset X sells for a lower price, precisely because X
cannot be used as collateral and thus cannot be tranched into the same pieces as Y .
We calculate the equilibrium for the probabilities γUh = 1 − (1 − h)2 and dYD = .4.
Results are shown in Table 9.
Table 9: Collateral Equilibrium.
Asset Y Price
p 1.1413
Price of Arrow U
a 0.8445
Price of Arrow D
b 0.7420
Marginal buyer of Arrow U h1 0.6056
Marginal buyer of Arrow D h2 0.1386
Without loss of generality, we fix the price of X to be 1 in state 0, and the price
of consumption to be 1 in states U and D. We denote the price of the asset at 0 by
p. In equilibrium there are two marginal buyers h1 and h2 . All agents h > h1 will
buy all of Y , and sell the down tranche (0, dYD ), hence effectively holding only the U
Arrow security. Agents h2 < h < h1 will sell all their endowment of Y and purchase
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all of the riskless asset X. Finally, agents h < h2 will sell their assets Y and X and
buy the down tranche from the most optimistic investors.
In this example the No-Default Theorem holds, and collateral equilibrium does
not involve default. But notice that in this example the Binomial State Pricing
Theorem fails. The price a = 0.8445 of the U Arrow security and the price b = 0.7420
of the D Arrow security correctly price the risky asset Y (1.1314 = .8445+(.4).7420),
and the contracts promising (0, j). But the state prices a and b do not price the
riskless asset X, whose price is equal to 1 < pU + pD = 1.5865. The reason for
this, as discussed in Section 3, is that though we have an upper bound for the price
(1.5865) given by the seller’s side, we cannot find a lower bound. The seller of X is
not on net buying anything that lies in the payoff cone, since X cannot be tranched.
This is why in this more complicated Binomial economy with two assets, we cannot
find state prices that price all the securities. This, as explained in Fostel-Geanakoplos
(2012b), can generate asset prices bubbles.
The equilibrium is, as usual, not unique because there are other trivially equivalent equilibria. Trade could have happened instead via any promise (0, j) backed by
Y with j > dYD . Such a contract would have sold for the same price as the promise
(0, dYD ), and delivered the same amount.

5.3

Example 3: Binomial Economy with One Asset and Two
Families of Financial Contracts.

This example shows how the Simple State Pricing Theorem fails when two contract
types can be written on the same asset.
Suppose there are four investors h = A, B, C, D with utilities
U A (c0 , cU , cD ) = c0 + cU ,
cD
U B (c0 , cU , cD ) = c0 + min(cU , )
2
cU
C
U (c0 , cU , cD ) = c0 + min( , cD )
2
D
U (c0 , cU , cD ) = c0 + cD

Suppose agents A and D each begin with 1/2 unit of the consumption good c0
A
D
and nothing else. So eA = (1/2, (0, 0)) = eD and y0∗
= y0∗
= 0. Agents B and C
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B
C
each begin with one unit of the asset Y . So eB = (0, (0, 0)) = eC and y0∗
= y0∗
= 1.
Suppose Y pays dU = dD = 1 of the consumption good over the two states. Finally,
suppose that there are two contract families, I and J , where the i-th contract of
family I pays i( 21 , 1) and the j-th contract of family J pays j(1, 21 ). It is obvious
that the max min contracts are i∗ = 1 = j ∗ .

Table 10. Collateral Equilibrium with No Default: Prices and Leverage.
Variable
Notation Value
Asset Price
p
1
Max min Contract Price
πj ∗
0.5
Max min Contract Price
π i∗
0.5
Leverage
LT Vj ∗
0.5
Leverage
LT Vi∗
0.5
Table 11. Collateral Equilibrium with No Default: Allocations.
Asset and Collateral
Asset y
Contracts ϕj ∗ Contracts ϕi∗
A
1
0
1
B
0
0
−1
C
0
−1
0
D
1
1
0
Consumption
s=0
s=1
s=2
A
0
0.5
0
B
0.5
0.5
1
C
0.5
1
0.5
D
0
0
0.5
It is also obvious that there is an equilibrium with p = 1 and πi∗ = 1/2 = πj ∗
described by Tables 10 and 11.13 Notice that the state prices (a, b) = (1, 0) are needed
to price the asset and all the j contracts, while different state prices (a, b) = (0, 1)
are needed to price the asset and all the i contracts.14 This is the case because agent
D, when selling contract j, is effectively buying the D Arrow security which is not
13

This can most easily be seen by considering the two sub-economies {A, B} and {C, D} separately, and then realizing that their equilibria can be spliced together to form an equilibrium for
the economy with all the agents {A, B, C, D}.
14
The Arrow-Debreu equilibrium has state prices pU = pD = 1/4; agents B and C end up
consuming 1/2 each of c0 , agent A consumes 2 units of c1 , and agent D consumes 2 units of cD .
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in the positive span of the max min of the family i and the U Arrow security (the
payoff cone for that ray). On the other hand, agent A when selling contract i, is
effectively buying the U Arrow security, which is not in the positive span of the max
min of the family j and the D Arrow security (the payoff cone for that ray).

5.4

Example 4. CAPM with Default

In this example we extend example 1 to three states of the world, showing that then
the No-Default Theorem and the State Pricing theorem fail to hold. In this example
actual default matters. We retain the CAPM quadratic utilities, defined in general
in example 1. But now S = {0, U, M, D}. Asset Y pays ds units of the consumption
good in state s, where dU ≥ dM ≥ dD . Only non-contingent promises of the form
(j, j, j) are allowed, and each one is collateralized by one unit of asset Y .
We solve the equilibrium for the following parameter values: asset payoffs (dU , dM , dD ) =
(3, 2, 1), asset endowments, y0T∗ = 0, y0A∗ = 1, good endowments, eT = (eT0 , (eTU , eTM , eTD )) =
T
A
A
A A
(2, (1, 2, 2)), and eA = (eA
0 , (eU , eM , eD )) = (6, (6, 2, 2)), risk aversion α = .1, α =
.1, finally, probabilities, γsh = 1/3, ∀h, ∀s. Tables 12 and 13 show the equilibrium.
Table 12. Collateral Equilibrium with Default: Prices and Leverage.
Variable
Notation Value
Asset Price
p
2.4041
Contract Price
πj=dM
2.0836
Leverage
LT Vj=dM 0.8666
Table 13. Collateral Equilibrium with Default: Allocations.
Asset and Collateral
Asset y
Contracts ϕj=dM
Tolerant
1
1
Averse
0
−1
Consumption
s=0
s=1
s=2 s=3
Tolerant
1.6795
2
2
2
Averse
6.3205
8
4
3
In equilibrium type-T agents buy all the asset in the economy and use it all
as collateral to issue contracts that promises dM = 2. On the other hand, type-A
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agents sell all their asset and lend. There is default in state D in the economy.
The No-Default theorem does not apply in this case. Borrowers do not want to
borrow any less than what they do in equilibrium. Thus the max min contract
(1, 1, 1) = (dD , dD , dD ) is not traded in equilibrium, nor would agents be happy
trading it in any equilibrium of this example.

5.5

Example 5: Heterogeneous Beliefs with Default and Multiple LTVs.

This example is analogous to examples in Fostel-Geanakoplos (2012a). Consider a
continuum of risk neutral agents h ∈ H = (0, 1) with heterogeneous priors γsh over
the states s in period 1. Suppose each agent begins with one unit of asset Y, and
one unit of asset X. We suppose there is no consumption at time 0, and that there
are three states of nature instead of two. Asset Y pays off dU > dM > dD units
of the consumption good in the three states, and asset X pays off 1 unit of the
consumption good in each of the three states. Only Y can be used as collateral, and
every contract j promises a non-contingent vector (j, j, j) of the consumption good
in the three states. Not only do we find actual default, but we also find another
departure from the No-Default Theorem. This example shows that two contracts
will be traded: a risk-less contract as before that promises dD , the worst-case or max
min scenario in the future, and a risky contract that promises dM in all states but
defaults and delivers only dD in s = D.
For concreteness we display the equilibrium for the following prior probabilities
h
h
and asset payoffs: γUh = h, γM
= h(1 − h) and γD
= (1 − h)2 , and dU = 3, dM = 2
and dD = 1. Notice that the higher the h, the more optimistic the agent.
Table 14 shows the results. Without loss of generality, we take the price of asset
X to be 1 in state 0, and the price of the consumption good to be 1 in each state
s = U, M, D. It turns out that the agents can be partitioned into four groups,
separated by the three marginal buyers hM , hD , hB . All agents above hM = .93 hold
only the risky asset Y , obtained by selling all their X and borrowing all they can
on their Y via the risky bond j = dM . Their total holdings of Y are then the
1 − hM they collectively held as endowments, plus the y they collectively bought,
where it turns out that 1 − hM + y = .35.15 The next most optimistic agents
15

Notice that total asset holdings consist of initial endowments, 1 − .93, plus new purchases, .27.
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.93 = hM > h > hD = .66 buy the remaining .65 units of the risky asset Y, obtained
by selling all their X and by selling the riskless contract j = dD . Investors with
.66 = hD > h > hB = .48 sell all their assets X and Y and simply buy (lend) in
the risky bond market, i.e. they buy all of the risky contracts j = dM . The most
pessimistic investors h < hB = .48 hold all of the X and buy (lend) in the default-free
market j = dD . Clearly the riskless contract j = dD and the asset X are perfect
substitutes, and since the most pessimistic agents are buying both, they must sell
for the same price per unit promised.
Table 14: Collateral Equilibrium with Default and Multiple Contracts.
Marginal Buyers
hM
0.9307
hD
0.6589
hB
0.4839
Prices
Asset price
p
2.4197
Bond price
πdM 1.7336
Asset purchases in the risky market
y
0.276
When the asset can take on at most two immediate successor values, equilibrium
determines a unique actively traded promise (the max min contract) and hence leverage. With three or more successor values, we cannot expect just a single promise to
emerge in equilibrium. In this example there is default in equilibrium, and different
agents buy the same asset with different leverage. But equilibrium still determines
the economy-wide average leverage used to buy the asset. Equilibrium leverage is
presented in table 15. There are four securities in total, three risky securities and
one risk-less security. Columns 2 and 3 show the holdings and value of such holdings
for each of the securities. Most importantly, column 4 shows the LT V of each of the
two traded contracts. As was expected, LT V is higher for the risky contracts (they
have a higher promise), LT Vj=dM > LT Vj=dD . Finally, column 5 shows the asset
LT V Y . As defined in section 2, asset LT V is a weighted average, so it is obtained
from the total amount borrowed using all contracts, .5986 + .6547 divided by the
total value of collateral, 2.4197 × 1.
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Table 15: Equilibrium Leverage.
Security
Holdings Holdings Value Contract LT V
Y lev Medium
0.3453
0.8355
0.7165
Y lev Min
0.6547
1.5842
0.4133
Risky Bond
0.3453
0.5986
Riskless Bond
0.6547
0.6547

Asset LT V
0.5180
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